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DE RUEHRL #0988/01 1011551 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 111551Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2525 INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7397 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0555 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 8569 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1040

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STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/AGS, EUR/PGI, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 TAGS: PTER EFIN KCRM PINR PREL GM

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GERMAN ACTION AGAINST THE PKK

REF: A. BERLIN 889

¶B. STATE 35685 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John A. Cloud, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Recent allegedly PKK-linked violence in Germany and one arrest in Berlin formed the backdrop for continued engagement with senior German officials pursuant to ref B.

Demonstrations

¶2. (C) According to local press reports, on the evening of April 1, alleged PKK supporters damaged several cars and broke a Turkish restaurant window in Berlin's Kreuzberg district. The next night, demonstrators damaged a few cars and broke the window of a Turkish club in Berlin's Wedding district. Interior Ministry Counterterrorism Director General for Counterterrorism Gerhard Schindler told EMIN April 7 there were up to 300 demonstrations in dozens of cities throughout Germany following recent events in Turkey. Schindler said it was unclear whether the demonstrations were spontaneous or ordered by PKK leadership, but his sense was that they were spontaneous. In general, the demonstrations were not violent; those in Berlin were the exception.

PKK Leader Arrested

- 13. (U) According to the Federal General Prosecutor's announcement, on April 3 German authorities arrested 35 year old Turkish female of Kurdish heritage "Gulay A." pursuant to a 31 May 1999 outstanding arrest warrant. The Prosecutor accused the suspect, who used the AKA "Beritan," of being a PKK leader from July 1995 to June 1996 in Westfalia and participating in mid-1996 attacks against Turkish and European institutions. The attacks included seven with molotov cocktails at a Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, a German savings bank, two travel agencies, a police station, and a post office and caused significant damage, although no injuries. The accused traveled to Germany in January 2006 and applied for asylum.
- 14. (C) MFA Counterterrorism Office Director Matthias Sonn (strictly protect) provided Acting Global Affairs Counselor with additional information. German authorities identified the accused when her fingerprints from her January 2006 asylum application -- under a false name -- matched those on the arrest warrant. Authorities also seized two cellphones and other material which they are currently reviewing.

- ¶5. (S) At his meeting with EMIN, Schindler elaborated on German efforts to target the PKK "middle and upper" leadership. Schindler called the PKK very insular and suspicious, which made them a difficult target for German under cover agents, but Germany had years of experience and had made some good progress, especially regarding funding: where and how they collected money and how they transmitted it to Turkey. Schindler said in mid-2005 several German law enforcement agencies collaborated to target the PKK, and would do so again in 2006. A key finding in 2005 was the role of PKK-linked media in PKK financing, notably the annual "autumn fundraising campaign," which prompted the September ban of E. Xani (ref A). He confirmed that the ban will be reinstated with a revised law, but that the law will not be ready until 2007. He noted that along with E. Xani, in September Germany had banned the much smaller affiliate Mesopotamia News Agency, but unlike E. Xani, Mesopotamia had not reopened in Germany but instead had reopened in Belgium under the name "Firat."
- 16. (S) Regarding cooperation with Turkey, Schindler said the two countries' counterterrorism policy makers and law enforcement agencies cooperated well; the two law enforcement agencies had another meeting scheduled the week of April 10, when they would again discuss the PKK. He denied that Turkey needed legal assistance; referring to weak Turkish extradition requests, he said that on occasion the papers Turkish officials provided were voluminous and compelling: "they are smart, they know what they need to do, they have done it before." But often the information that convincingly tied a suspect to PKK crimes simply did not exist, Schindler said.
- ¶7. (C) Responding in detail to questions raised in ref B concerning the possibility that PKK members might obtain asylum in Germany, Schindler admitted such a possibility existed until 2002, but now the chances were "as good as none, and for Iraqi Kurds, absolutely not." (NOTE: "Gulay A." applied for, but did not receive, asylum. END NOTE.) He reiterated the role of asylum authorities in the German Counterterrorism Center, where a working group focused on Afghan returnees, Iraqi returnees, and the PKK to prevent abuse of asylum. He also stressed that German asylum status can be revoked. Concerning ref B's question about PKK support elsewhere in Europe, Schindler said the PKK was not a major problem in France, but that the PKK had abused the "generous asylum and liberal free speech policies" of the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries.

Foreign Ministry

18. (C) MFA CT Director Sonn told Acting Global Affairs Counselor April 10 he had discussed the U.S. concern about the PKK with MFA CT Commissioner Witschel after Witschel's meeting with EMIN (ref A). After noting the recent arrest, Sonn said the case proves that Germany does not have a lack of will to target the PKK, but occasionally Germany had a lack of information. Reiterating comments he said he made during his recent visit to Washington, he said evidence was crucial because German judges were skeptical of Turkish information. They would give more of the benefit of the doubt, he said, to documents from French or Bulgarian prosecutors. The alleged anti-Kurdish bias of the Turkish government made the Turkish prosecutors' job more difficult, Sonn said.

Turkish Embassy

19. (C) Acting Global Affairs Officer alerted Turkish Embassy Counselor Tuzun to the MFA and MOI meetings before they took place, but has not been able to reach him after the meetings (and the arrest) to get his reaction before this cable was

transmitted. Post will stay in contact with the Turkish Embassy as this effort continues. CLOUD